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Case No. 930725-CA 
Priority No. 2 
-oooooOooooo-
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This court has jurisdiction over appeals from the Circuit 
Court pursuant to Utah Code Annotated § 78-2a-3(2)(d) (1992). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE 
Were the circumstances and information available to the 
police officer who stopped Mr.Case's car sufficient to create a 
reasonable suspicion for the stop? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The results of trial court determinations of reasonable 
suspicion are reviewable nondeferentially for correctness. State 
v. Pena. 232 Utah Adv. Rep. 3, 6-7 (Utah 1994). But due to the 
fact specific nature of such determinations, the Utah Supreme 
Court has also concluded that trial judges retain a "measure of 
1 
discretion" in applying the "reasonable suspicion" legal standard 
to the facts of a case. Id. 
With respect to purely factual determinations, such as those 
"underlying the trial court's decisions to grant or deny a motion 
to suppress evidence . . . ," the review is for clear error only. 
State v. Brown, 853 P.2d 851 (Utah 1992) (cited in Pena at 8 n.4). 
"[I]t will never be appropriate for an appellate court to overturn 
a trial court's factual determinations when they have substantial 
record support." Pena at 8 n.4. 
RULES, STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
The following pertinent provisions are set forth in Addendum 
D: the Fourth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States; 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-7-15 (1953 as amended); and Article I, § 7 
and §14 of the Constitution of the State of Utah. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant James B. Case was arrested for driving under the 
influence of alcohol on June 26, 1992. Through counsel, he later 
filed a motion to suppress evidence which asserted that the stop 
which led to Mr. Case's arrest was not supported by reasonable 
suspicion. 
On September 24, 1992, at a hearing on this issue, the trial 
court heard testimony from the University of Utah police officer 
who had stopped Mr. Case's car. Following this hearing, the 
parties submitted legal memoranda to the court, and the motion was 
subsequently denied on November 9, 1992. The trial judge's bases 
for denying the defense motion were put on the record at that 
2 
time. The judge signed the "Findings of Fact & Conclusions of 
Law" on December 23, 1992, and the "Supplemental Findings of Fact 
& Conclusions of Law" on January 11, 1993. 
Mr. Case then entered a guilty plea on February 22, 1993, but 
reserved the right to appeal the reasonable suspicion issue under 
State v. Sery, 758 P.2d 935 (Utah App. 1988). Because sentencing 
was stayed pending appeal, the original appeal of this matter was 
dismissed due to the lack of a final judgment. Sentencing took 
place on October 14, 1993, imposition of which was stayed pending 
this appeal. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
Between two and three o'clock in the morning on June 26, 
1992, two officers of the University of Utah Police Department 
received a radio dispatch concerning a suspected car prowl or 
automobile burglary- Officer John LeFevre and Officer Denise 
Bradfield were directed to the 100 Court area of University 
Village at the University of Utah in order to investigate the 
complaint which had been relayed to them. (See Addendum A, "Motion 
to Suppress Transcript" at 1-3, 14-17 (hereinafter "MTr.").) The 
dispatch had described the suspect as a "chunky male, possibly 
Hispanic, wearing a white t-shirt." (See MTr. at 2. See also 
Addendum C, Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law at 1 2 
(hereinafter "FFCL").) 
Officer Bradfield was the first to arrive at the 100 Court 
area, where she " check [ed] out an individual on foot" in that 
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vicinity.1 (MTr. at 16.) Afterward, she joined with Officer 
LeFevre to assist him as backup officer. (MTr. at 15.) 
Responding to the dispatch, a short distance from the 100 
Court area on his patrol motorcycle, Officer LeFevre took note of 
a passenger riding in a gold Trans Am. The car's location and 
direction suggested that it might have been coming from the 100 
Court area, the vicinity of the suspected car prowl. Furthermore, 
the passenger appeared to fit the suspect described in the 
dispatch. (MTr. at 2.) 
That passenger was later identified as Richard Farnsworth. 
(MTr. at 7-8, 29; FFCL 5 7.) At 5 feet 6 inches and 184 pounds, 
Mr. Farnsworth was in fact "chunky," and, although not Hispanic, 
"in the dark and at a distance could have looked Hispanic with his 
dark hair and moustache."2 (See Addendum B, "Ruling Transcript" at 
4 (hereinafter "RTr.").) He was also wearing a light-colored t-
shirt which was visible to Officer LeFevre beneath an unzipped 
jacket.3 (MTr. at 4, 9-10, 29; FFCL 19.) 
1
 Contrary to the assertion on page 5 of the Brief of Appellant, 
this individual was never described to the court by Officer 
Bradfield. There is no reference in any part of the record to 
this person's appearance, to his or her gender, to the length of 
this prior detention, to the extent of police questioning of this 
person, or to Officer Bradfield's reasons for allowing this person 
to leave. (MTr. at 14-17.) 
2 This underlying, factual determination, of course, was made by 
the trial judge after sitting in the same courtroom as Mr. 
Farnsworth and watching him testify. The Brief of Appellant, in 
footnote 2 of page 6, refers to the court's acknowledgement that 
Mr. Farnsworth is not actually Hispanic. Yet after looking at Mr. 
Farnsworth and making the relevant factual determination, the 
court came to the opposite conclusion as the Defendant, and stated 
that the officer was "not acting on some hunch . . . . " (See 
Addendum B, "Ruling Transcript" at 4 (hereinafter "RTr.") 
(emphasis added).) 
3 Although Defendant goes to some length to establish the shirt's 
actual color as pink (Br. of Appellant at 5-6), the trial judge 
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Thinking that Mr. Farnsworth, the passenger in the passing 
Trans Am, was the subject of the dispatch, Officer LeFevre 
initiated a traffic stop near the entrance to University Village 
at Sunnyside Boulevard. (MTr. at 2, 29; FFCL 91 10.) The officer 
approached Mr. Farnsworth and, during a brief, initial detention, 
determined that he had legitimate business in the University 
Village area and was not involved in a car prowl or automobile 
burglary. (MTr. at 2.) During this contact, Officer Bradfield 
arrived at the scene of the stop. In her opinion Mr. Farnsworth 
"did appear to fit the description" of the suspect in the 
dispatch. (MTr. at 15.) In fact, according to Officer Bradfield, 
it was "determined that the individual that [they] were looking 
for was the passenger [Mr. Farnsworth] and that [he] had a valid 
reason for being in that area." (MTr. at 17 (emphasis added).) 
However, while speaking to Mr. Farnsworth and the driver of 
the Trans Am, the Defendant James B. Case, Officer LeFevre was 
exposed to evidence "in plain view and plain smell [which] gave 
rise to additional suspicions which the officer then acted upon." 
The Defendant and Appellant, James B. Case, was subsequently 
arrested for Driving Under the Influence of Alcohol. (MTr. at 30; 
FFCL 1 13.) 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The information available to the officer stopping the 
Defendant was a sufficient basis for reasonable suspicion under 
the "totality of the circumstances" test, justifying an 
described the shirt for the record saying it "looks like the t-
shirt is white." (MTr. at 5.) 
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investigatory stop. A report of possible "car prowling" in a 
specific geographic area, combined with a basic physical 
description of a suspect and the clothing worn, suffice to create 
"reasonable suspicion" meriting investigation. That information 
was received as the result of an anonymous phone call. 
Corroboration of an anonymous phone call, through the personal 
observations of an investigating police officer, can provide the 
required "indicia of reliability". The degree of detail required 
and the exact extent of the required "match" between description 
and suspect is not a rigid standard, especially in the context of 
an officer conducting an investigation into the merits of a 
dispatch. Here, the passenger of the Defendant can reasonably be 
considered to have fallen within the scope of the description. An 
investigatory stop of a vehicle leaving the area with a passenger 
who appeared to meet the dispatch description - in an effort to 
"maintain the status quo" in the course of the investigation - was 
justifiable and reasonable, and did not violate the Fourth 
Amendment. 
ARGUMENT 
The Defendant's arguments are divisible into two categories. 
The first concerns alleged discrepancies between the description 
of the suspect as communicated by dispatch, and the passenger's 
actual appearance at the time of the stop. These discrepancies 
are asserted primarily in the "Statement of Facts" of the Brief of 
Appellant, and in section D of the "Argument". The second 
category revolves around the sufficiency of the dispatch's 
information in order to create a reasonable suspicion for the 
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stop. We will discuss the alleged factual discrepancies first, 
since it is of tantamount importance that we know what the facts 
are before drawing legal conclusions based on those facts. 
I. THE TRIAL COURT MADE FINDINGS OF FACT WHICH APPLY IN 
THIS CASE# AND WHICH MUST NOT BE DISREGARDED WITHOUT A 
SHOWING OF CLEAR ERROR. 
Search and seizure issues, in particular, are highly fact 
sensitive. State v. Lopez, 237 Utah Adv. Rep. 9, 10 (Utah 1994). 
Such is the case here, where a police officer's perceptions are 
presented for appellate review only through the trial judge's 
assessment of an individual's physical characteristics. Once such 
underlying factual determinations are made, they must be accepted 
as facts unless and until they are shown to be clearly erroneous. 
"[I]t will never be appropriate for an appellate court to overturn 
a trial court's factual determinations when they have substantial 
record support." Pena at 8 n.4. 
Despite the assertion on page 18 of the Brief of Appellant 
that the passenger did not match the description given in the 
dispatch, this is contrary to the trial judge's factual 
determinations as presented by the record. The trial judge 
stated, on the record, that the passenger was "chunky" (RTr. at 
2), with a "moderate complexion" (RTr. at 2), and that "in the 
dark and at a distance [he] could have looked Hispanic with his 
dark hair and moustache" (RTr. at 4). In addition, the trial 
judge stated that the passenger's t-shirt, albeit pink on closer 
inspection, "looks . . . white", (MTr. at 5) and furthermore, that 
the shirt "would have been visible to the officer who made the 
stop" (RTr. at 2). 
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Nevertheless, the Defendant would have this court disregard 
these factual determinations. For instance, as discussed in 
footnote 2, supra, at one point in the Brief of Appellant, the 
Defendant uses an out-of-context statement of the trial judge to 
divert attention from the judge's actual assessment: that it was 
reasonable for the police officer to think that the passenger fit 
the description of "Hispanic". 
The trial judge's factual findings, then, tell us that the 
passenger in the Defendant's car matched the description received 
via the dispatch. From these findings, the trial judge went on to 
draw a conclusion about the stop which falls within the "measure 
of discretion" anticipated by the Utah Supreme Court in Pena. The 
trial judge concluded that "[b]ased on the description that the 
Officer had received, it was reasonable to think that the vehicle 
he was stopping contained the subject of the dispatch." (FFCL 
111.) In his verbal pronouncement, on the record, the judge was 
even more specific: "[The police officer] wasn't acting on some 
hunch. He thought that the vehicle he was stopping contained the 
subject of a dispatch . . . ." (RTr. at 3, # 1-3.) See State v. 
Truiillo. 739 P.2d 85, 88 (Utah App. 1987) (quoting Terrv v. Ohio, 
392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968), in that 
reasonable suspicion cannot be based on "inarticulate hunches"). 
This is a conclusion which should not be subject to a "close, de 
novo review" due to its high dependence on facts which only the 
trial judge perceived in person.^ pena at 6. 
4 The determination that the officer was not acting on a "hunch" 
is actually more of a secondary finding of fact--based on the 
original findings which applied the dispatch to physical 
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II. THE TOTALITY OF THE CIRCUMSTANCES INDICATE THAT THE 
OFFICER'S STOP WAS BASED ON A REASONABLE SUSPICION. 
A. Reasonable Suspicion and Totality of the Circumstances. 
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution 
protects people not against all seizures, but against unreasonable 
seizures. State v. Lopez. 237 Utah Adv. Rep. 9, 11 (Utah 1994) 
(citing Terrv v. Ohio. 392 U.S. 1, 9 (1968)). To determine what 
is or is not a reasonable seizure, "there is 'no ready test . . . 
other than by balancing the need to search [or seize] against the 
invasion which the search [or seizure] entails.' " Terrv v. Ohio. 
392 U.S. 1, 21, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 1879, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968) 
(quoting Camara v. Municipal Court. 387 U.S. 523, 534-35 (1967)). 
See also State v. Baird. 763 P.2d 1214, 1216 (Utah App. 1988). 
But to avoid seizures based on "inarticulate hunches," there 
are certain guidelines of analysis. For instance, the United 
States Supreme Court tells us that an objective question must be 
asked while reviewing the specific facts of each case: "[W]ould 
the facts available to the officer at the moment of the seizure or 
the search 'warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief 
that the action taken was appropriate?" Terrv at 392 U.S. 21-22, 
appearances--than it is a conclusion of law. However, because it 
is a finding of fact which by itself can determine the ultimate 
legal conclusion, we must stress the need for trial court 
discretion on such an issue. The Utah Supreme Court has adopted 
the belief that "discretion ought to be left to a trial court . . 
. when the trial judge has observed 'facts,' such as a witness's 
appearance and demeanor, relevant to the application of the law 
that cannot be adequately reflected in the record available to 
appellate courts." Pena at 6 (paraphrasing Professor Maurice 
Rosenberg in Judicial Discretion of the Trial Court. Viewed From 
Above. 22 Syracuse L. Rev. 635 (1971)). 
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88 S.Ct. 1880 (quoting Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 
(1925), emphasis added). 
Utah has adopted the "Terry" standards in a multitude of 
cases which indicate that a stop is justified where there are 
"specific, articulable facts which, together with rational 
inferences drawn from those facts, would lead a reasonable person 
to conclude" that a crime had been or was about to be committed by 
the person stopped. State v. Sierra, 754 P.2d 972 (Utah App. 
1988) . The standard has also been codified in Utah Code 
Annotated, § 77-7-15 (1980): 
A peace officer may stop any person in a public 
place when he has a reasonable suspicion to believe he 
has committed or is in the act of committing or is 
attempting to commit a public offense and may demand his 
name, address and an explanation of his actions. 
In applying this standard, this court has previously determined 
that since " [t]here is no bright line test for determining if 
reasonable suspicion exists . . . [t]he courts must look at the 
totality of the circumstances." State v. Potter, 863 P.2d 40, 43 
(Utah App. 1993). See also United States v. Sokolow. 490 U.S. 1 
(1989), and State v. Steward, 806 P.2d 213, 215 (Utah App. 1991). 
B. The Totality of the Circumstances Presented to Officer 
LeFevre was Sufficient to Create a Reasonable Suspicion. 
The dispatch information received by Officer LeFevre was 
specific as to the location of the suspected car prowl or vehicle 
burglary, directing him to a "common parking area at the 100 court 
of the University Village." (FFCL 5 1.) This information was 
coupled with the description of a chunky male wearing a white t-
shirt who was possibly Hispanic. But in order to look at the 
totality of the circumstances, one must also consider the facts as 
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perceived by Officer LeFevre in addition to the raw data he had 
heard over the radio. Alabama v. white. 496 U.S. 328 (1990); 
Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983). 
First upon arriving at the University Village area. Officer 
LeFevre discovered that a person matching the suspect's 
description did in fact exist. The officer had just listened to a 
description of a possible crime suspect, and sure enough, someone 
matching the description was there. Second, that person was in 
the general vicinity of the incident being investigated, and was 
heading away from the specific location reported. 
These perceptions, coupled with the raw data of the dispatch, 
form the totality of the circumstances. Alabama v. White. 49 6 U.S. 
at 330-32. The defendant argues that the stop was made "prior to 
attempting to corroborate any of the dispatch information." (Br. 
of Appellant at 7.) To the contrary: the officer's perceptions 
just prior to making the stop had corroborated the dispatch 
information in every particular. With this corroboration in mind, 
"the facts available to the officer at the moment of the seizure" 
reasonably warranted the brief intrusion of a traffic stop. Terry 
at 21-22. 
Officer LeFevre did not have the opportunity to go to the 
parking lot to look for witnesses or signs of vehicle burglary. 
Yet, once he was on his way to the scene of the complaint, Officer 
LeFevre was engaged in an investigation of a possible crime. That 
investigating officer made an on-the-spot observation of a suspect 
leaving the scene. In balancing the need to seize presented by 
this situation against the relatively minor invasion constituted 
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by a traffic stop,5 it is clear that the protections of the Fourth 
Amendment were not violated. 
In Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 328 (1990), a case cited in the 
Brief of Appellant on page 10, the United States Supreme Court 
tells us that an anonymous tip, coupled with even incomplete 
corroboration, can provide the "requisite quantum of suspicion." 
Id. at 330. That case concerned a Terry stop based on anonymous 
information that a certain woman would be found to be in 
possession of cocaine. The Court's totality of the circumstances 
analysis concluded that while the tip by itself would not have 
been enough, subsequent observations by the police "sufficiently 
corroborated [the tip] to furnish reasonable suspicion." Id. at 
331. Central to the Court's finding in Alabama v. White was the 
level of suspicion called for: "[T]he level of suspicion required 
for a Terry stop is obviously less demanding than for probable 
cause." Ifl, at 330 (quoting United States v. Sokolow. 490 U.S. 1, 
7 (1989)). 
C. The Defendant is Asking the Court to Ignore the Totality 
of the Circumstances. 
By reviewing each aspect of the stop separately, the Brief of 
Appellant ignores the totality of the circumstances which led to 
Officer LeFevre's reasonable suspicion. First, the Appellant-
Defendant focuses on the anonymous nature of the call which was 
5 Minor, that is, relative to the standard of probable cause. As 
stated by the U.S. Supreme Court in United States v. Sokolow, 490 
U.S. 1, 7 (1989): "The Fourth Amendment requires 'some minimal 
level of objective justification* for making the stop. INS v. 
Delcrado, 466 U.S. 210, 217 . . . (1984). That level of suspicion 
is considerably less than proof of wrongdoing by a preponderance 
of the evidence." 
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the basis of the dispatch. However, the anonymity of the caller, 
by itself, does not make a dispatch inherently unreliable. Alabama 
v. White, 496 U.S. at 328-32. The need for caution in responding 
to anonymous tips is due to the possibility of vindictive callers 
who are attempting to harass or frame a specific individual. And 
as stated on page 13 of the Brief of Appellant, there are those 
with "misguided motives" who will "misuse police and 911 
services." But in the case of calls which report only the 
possibility of criminal acts, there is little risk of underlying, 
vindictive motivation, since it is left to the officers to 
determine who is or is not a suspect. This low level of risk 
should also be balanced against the level of intrusion involved in 
a brief traffic stop. Furthermore, as discussed above, the 
combination of the dispatch's content with the police officer's 
own corroborating observations acts to supply the "quantity and 
quality" of information necessary for reasonable suspicion. 
Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. at 330. 
The case situations presented in the Brief of Appellant are 
distinguishable from the case at hand. The primary analogies in 
the Appellant-Defendant's argument are cases where anonymous 
callers' tips were not corroborated in any way by the responding 
officers' observations. For the most part, in fact, the officers' 
observations would have discredited the information received. In 
Olson v. Commissioner of Public Safety. 371 N.W.2d 552 (Minn. 
1985), for instance, the reviewing court refers with approval to 
another Minnesota case, Marben v. State, Dep't of Public Safety. 
294 N.W.2d 697 (Minn. 1980), in noting that the officer in Marben 
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responded to an anonymous tip "when he was in the immediate 
vicinity . . . [and so] was able to verify the reliability of the 
tip." Olson at 556. The Olson court went on to suggest a 
different outcome in the case before it if the officer had 
"corroborated the anonymous tip and justified an investigative 
stop." Id. 
In State v. White. 856 P.2d 656 (Utah App. 1993), this 
court's conclusions also centered on the lack of corroboration of 
an anonymous tip. In that case, the officer's observations 
actually contradicted the information received from the informant, 
as well as the officer's own "experience and expectations." White 
at 666. 
In the case at bar, the defendant's passenger fell reasonably 
within the parameters of the description. In State v. Bruce, 779 
P.2d 646 (Utah 1989), an investigatory stop was ruled to be legal, 
even though the police dispatch was inaccurate. The police 
dispatch in Bruce included a description of a car that could not 
be linked to the crime other than having been unfamiliar to the 
witness and having been seen leaving the area shortly after the 
commission of the crime. The witness did not see the individual 
who committed the crime get into the described vehicle; indeed, 
the witness did not see who was in the vehicle as it drove away. 
Also, the police broadcast inaccurately described the car as 
occupied by two individuals, even when no one had any idea how 
many persons actually occupied the vehicle, or whether they were 
in fact participants in the crime. Where only one person had been 
identified as committing the robbery, the broadcast indicated two 
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persons were in the vehicle, Bruce at 648. The Bruce court 
concluded: 
We find no error in the trial court's factual 
evaluation underlying its decision to deny the motion to 
suppress. While the police officers who issued the 
broadcast may have improperly placed two black males in 
the front seat of the orange car, other sufficient 
information was provided and "articulable facts" existed 
to support at least a "reasonable suspicion" that the 
robber of the store was in the orange car. Thus, the 
stop was made in "objective reliance" on the broadcast, 
which was issued by officers possessing "a reasonable 
suspicion justifying a stop." 
Bruce at 650-51. The Defendant-Appellant indicates that a police 
officer can establish reasonable suspicion by personally observing 
criminal activity, or by receiving reliable information via radio 
broadcast. (Br. of Appellant at 10.) Further, the Defendant 
indicates that information contained in a broadcast bulletin must 
be supported by reasonable suspicion. Defendant cites from 
Alabama v. White. discussed above: "Reasonable suspicion . . . is 
dependent upon both the content of information possessed by police 
and its degree of reliability. Both factors - quantity and 
quality - are considered in the totality of the circumstances -
the whole picture." Alabama v. White at 330. 
Defendant-Appellant does not carry the "totality of the 
circumstances" test far enough. The Defendant-Appellant ignores 
the importance of the fact that this is indeed a "totality of the 
circumstances" test - "the whole picture". And thus, the way all 
the pieces of the puzzle fit together, and whether there are 
enough pieces of the puzzle present to support a reasonable 
suspicion, needs to include not only the quantity and quality of 
the information broadcast to the officers, but also a reasonable 
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linkage between the information broadcast and the personal 
observations of the officers at the scene which connect to confirm 
the reliability of the broadcast information. That linkage 
between "other sufficient information" in the broadcast and 
"articulable facts" personally observed by the officers combined 
in Bruce to overcome the outright inaccuracy of the broadcast in 
that case. 
Defendant misinterprets the importance of Bruce for our 
purposes here. In his brief, Defendant suggests that Bruce 
establishes some threshold for the detail required before an 
investigatory stop is justified. (Br. of Appellant at 15-16.) 
Bruce does not tell us how much detail is enough, beyond reciting 
the Terry standard. Bruce at 650. What Bruce does tell us is that 
"other sufficient information" and observed "articulable facts" 
may combine to support a "reasonable suspicion", even in the face 
of a significant factual discrepancy between the broadcast and the 
subject of the investigatory stop. Thus, when the Appellant-
Defendant points to variation between the dispatch description and 
the Appellant's passenger, the mere fact that there may have been 
variation is not persuasive. It is important to remember that the 
trial court found that the passenger could have been perceived as 
Hispanic-looking in the dark of night, and that the t-shirt was 
such that it could have been perceived as white. (RTr. at 2, 4; 
MTr. 5) . As for sitting in a car and wearing a black leather 
jacket over the t-shirt, these factual variations are no more 
severe than those in Bruce, where the dispatch described a car 
which had no connection to the crime other than the fact that it 
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was seen leaving the area closely in time to the report, and 
described two persons in the vehicle where in fact no one had seen 
how many persons were in the vehicle. Indeed, no one connected 
with the crime was actually seen to have entered the vehicle that 
was later stopped. Bruce at 648. 
The Terrv standard is a "totality of the circumstances" test, 
where "rational inferences" can generate "reasonable suspicion". 
The case at hand is a Terrv "rational inferences" stop: "In 
justifying the particular intrusion, 'the police officer must be 
able to point to specific and articulable facts which, taken 
together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably 
warrant that intrusion.' Terry. 392 U.S. at 21, 88 S.Ct. at 1880, 
20 L.Ed.2d at 906." Bruce at 650. These criteria, (1) specific 
and articulable facts, and (2) rational inferences from those 
facts, are satisfied here as set forth above. 
Bruce does indicate that: "It is clear that police officers 
'may in appropriate circumstances and in an appropriate manner 
approach a person for purposes of investigating possibly criminal 
behavior even though there is no probable cause to make an 
arrest.' Terrv v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 11, 22, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 1880, 20 
L.Ed.2d 889, 906-07 (1968)." Bruce at 650. Terrv and Bruce. then, 
give us three criteria for an investigatory stop: (1) appropriate 
circumstances; (2) appropriate manner; (3) possibly criminal 
behavior. Again, as set forth above, the facts of the case at 
hand meet all three criteria. 
What the officers observed at the scene here - an individual 
reasonably fitting the broadcast description, in the area of 
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suspected criminal activity, and within a reasonable time frame of 
the broadcast report - confirmed the reliability of the anonymous 
tip. Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. at 330-31. This, under the 
"totality of the circumstances" test, should be viewed as a 
sufficient basis for "reasonable suspicion". 
In State v. Pena, 232 Utah Adv. Rep. 3 (Utah 1994), the court 
held that an officer was not required to "allow a suspect who 
matched the detailed description given by the store clerk to 
continue until another officer had the opportunity to go to the 7-
Eleven store and interview the clerk." Pena at 7. This should be 
viewed as an expression of the policy rationale that, given a 
physical description in the context of a possible crime, a police 
officer is not required to search the area and confirm that a 
crime has indeed been committed before being permitted to conduct 
an investigatory stop of a vehicle containing an individual who 
reasonable falls within the parameters of the description. 
This position, that a suspect need not be permitted to 
proceed pending confirmation of a crime, has been expressed 
favorably by the United States Supreme Court: 
The Fourth Amendment does not require a policeman who 
lacks the precise level of information necessary for 
probable cause to arrest to simply shrug his shoulders 
and allow a crime to occur or criminal to escape. On 
the contrary, Terry recognizes that it may be the 
essence of good police work to adopt an intermediate 
response. . . . A brief stop of a suspicious 
individual, in order to determine his identity or to 
maintain the status quo momentarily while obtaining more 
information, may be most reasonable in light of the 
facts known to the officer at that time. 
Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 145-46, 92 S.Ct. 1921, 1922-23, 
32 L.Ed.2d 612 (1972) (emphasis added). This policy applies to 
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the case at hand. On the night in question, Officer LeFevre took 
a reasonable "intermediate" approach and "maintained the status 
quo momentarily while obtaining more information" - a response 
"most reasonable in light of the facts known to the officer at 
that time". 
CONCLUSION 
The S t a t e / A p p e l l e e r e s p e c t f u l l y r e q u e s t s t h a t t h i s c o u r t 
s u s t a i n t h e c o n v i c t i o n of t h e D e f e n d a n t a s b a s e d on an 
i n v e s t i g a t o r y s t o p r e s u l t i n g from r e a s o n a b l e s u s p i c i o n u n d e r t h e 
t o t a l i t y of t h e c i r c u m s t a n c e s . 
R e s p e c t f u l l y s u b m i t t e d t h i s ^ day of J u n e , 1994. 
LANGDON (FJSHER 
A t t o r n e y f o r P l a i n t i f f / A p p e l l e e 
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SALT LAKE CITY V. JAMES CASE 
TAPE NO. 1853 
CASE NO. 925018713TC 
JUDGE REESE 
ATD: DEBORAH KREECK MENDEZ 
ATP: STEVEN ZOLLINGER 
DIRECT EXAMINATION 
ATP: State your name for the record please. 
A: My name's Officer John LeFavre. I'm a police officer 
currently at the University of Utah Police Department. 
Q: And were you so employed on June 26th of this year? 
A: Yes, I was. 
Q: Were you working? 
A: Yes, I was. 
Q: Did you have occasion to respond to the University Village, 
I believe on that date at approximately 2:00 in the morning? 
A: Yes. 
Q: Between 2 and 3 o'clock in the morning? What caused you to 
respond to that area? 
A: I was dispatched concerning a call on a possible car prowler 
in the 100 court area at the University Village. 
Q: And was that dispatched through the normal procedure? 
A: Yes. 
Q: How does that occur? 
A: A dispatcher would receive a phone call or a complaint. The 
dispatcher would assign one or more officers to the detail and they 
would send us to the location of the complaint. 
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Q: On this particular occasion you stated you were dispatched 
on the possible car prowl. Did they give you any indication of what 
you were looking for? 
A: Yes, the information I was given from the dispatcher was a 
description of a male, possibly hispanic, chunky in build wearing a 
white t-shirt• 
Q: And upon arriving at the 100 Co'urt did you take any action? 
A: Yes, I did. 
Q: What action did you take? 
A: I saw a gold Firebird, I take it back it's a Pontiac leaving 
the 100 Court area with two occupants, the passenger of which met the 
description of the possible car prowler which the dispatch had given 
me. 
Q: How did you perceive the passenger in his appearance? 
A: He looked male hispanic in his appearance. He appeared to 
be chunky in build and he was wearing a white t-shirt. 
Q: On that basis did you stop the vehicle? 
A: Yes, I did. 
Q: And what did you discover when you stopped the vehicle? 
A: When I stopped the vehicle and talked to the occupants of 
the car I found that the both occupants had a legitimate reason for 
being in the 100 Court area. However, while speaking with the driver 
I noted an odor of an alcoholic beverage coming from within the car. 
Q: Upon closer observation of this passenger did he still 
appear to meet, fit the description of the suspect? 
A: Yes. 
- 2 -
Q: Was that the sole basis for your stop? 
A: Yes. 
Q: I have no further questions. 
JUDGE: Alright, cross-examination. 
CROSS - EXAMINATION 
ATD: Good morning officer. My name is Deborah Kreeck Mendez just 
so we're on equal terms here, we both know each other's names. 
Was anything else said in the dispatch call? Who made the call to 
dispatch? Was that information given to you? 
A: I, from what I 
Q: Was that information given to you on that day? 
ATP: Your honor, I would object under the state law and the 
recent U.S. Supreme Court law that it's not relevant who made the 
call. If he receives a dispatch from his dispatcher with subjective 
facts he doesn't have to rely it's determined that the dispatcher 
determined whether it was reliable. His response is based on his 
dispatch, not on who made the call. 
ATD: Then your honor, I believe that the dispatch needs to be 
here. The City's not produced the dispatch. I need to determine 
whether this was an anonymous phone call or a citizen's phone call. 
JUDGE: I don't know that it really hurts anybody if she asks the 
question and he answers. I'll overrule the objection. 
ATD: On that evening did you know over the dispatch did they say 
who made the phone call? 
A: They did not give me a name. 
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Q: And you saw Mr. Case driving the gold Trans Am? 
A: Yes. 
Q: And for the record I would like to state that Mr. Case has 
short dark-brown hair, he light and fair in complexion, he's about 
135 pounds and 5'7n. 
JUDGE: Is that a question? 
ATD: I'm just reading into the record to preface this question so 
the record will reflect the way he looks. Did you deem his to look 
Hispanic? 
A: The driver? 
Q: Ya. 
A: No. 
Q: Or chunky? 
A: No. 
Q: He was not the person that you suspected? 
A: That's correct. 
Q: Will you please describe for me the passenger of the car as 
specific detail as you can remember? 
A: From what I could see from my motorcycle the passenger 
appeared to be Hispanic, appeared to be chunky in build and was 
wearing a white t-shirt. 
Q: Would this be the t-shirt that he was wearing? 
A: I couldn't recall. 
Q: You can't recall? 
JUDGE: You need to have it referred to on the record so why don't 
you have it marked. 
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ATD: That's what I was going to ask. 
JUDGE: Defense exhibit 1 is a t-shirt. 
ATD: It's a white t-shirt danned of psychedelic colors across the 
top of it, logo, pink and purple logo on the right pocket. 
JUDGE: Is that correct officer? I think she's asking that 
question. 
ATD: Is that correct what this looks like? 
A: That seems to be a good description to me. 
JUDGE: For the record, looks like the t-shirt is white, it has a 
band of what 4 or 5 inches in the middle and surrounding the t-shirt 
and deep purple sort of floral pink and colors in there and gold as 
well. 
ATD: I think it's grey instead of gold. Do you know anything 
else other than what you've told us about the informant on this phone 
call? 
A: No. 
Q: Is there any details as to what the car prowl entailed given 
to you? 
A: No. 
Q: Just a car prowl, the general term car prowl. Is that what 
was used? 
A: Yes. I'm not sure whether they used the term car prowler or 
a possible automobile burglary. I'm not sure which it was. 
Q: That will be, all thank you. 
JUDGE: Any redirect? 
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REDIRECT 
ATP: Just for clarification, you didn't identify this shirt 
marked defense exhibit 1 as the shirt the individual you stopped was 
wearing? 
A: No, sir, I couldn't identify that, 
JUDGE: Anything else? 
ATP: Nope. 
ATD: No, your honor. 
JUDGE: Let me just follow-up officer. When you responded then what 
you had heard from dispatch was that there was a car burglary or 





There was a possible car prowler. 
And that was the location you were given? 
Yes. 
And the only other information you had that the suspect was 
chunky, was male, possibly Hispanic in a white t-shirt? 
A: That's correct. 
Q: So that's all you were going on when you arrived? 
A: Yes, sir. 
Q: Okay, you may have a seat. 
ATP: The City has no further witnesses. 
ATD: Your honor, I have a witness, 
JUDGE: Alright. The City rest of State rests? 
ATP: The State rests. 
JUDGE: Defense you may call your witness. 
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DIRECT EXAMINATION 
ATD: Could you state your name for the record please. 
A: Richard Farnworth. 
Q: And could you state your address. 
A: 124 T Street, Salt Lake City, DT. 
Q: What is your relation to Mr. Case? 
A: Cousin. 
JUDGE: Could you spell your last name, sir. 
A: Farnworth. 
ATD: On June 26 in the early morning hours were you with Mr. 
Case? 
A: Yes, I was. 
Q: Where were you? 
A: Dropping his girlfriend off at University Village. 
Q: Which court would that be in? 
A: I'm not sure of the court number actually. 
Q: How tall are you? 
A: 5'6" . 
Q: And how much do you weigh? 
A: About 184. 
Q: And what color is your hair? 
A: Brown. 
Q: And is it shoulder length? 
A: Ya. 








I'd say so. 
And what color are your eyes? 
Brown. 
On June 26 were you wearing this pink t-shirt? 
Yes. 
I'm sorry let me back-up? Were you a passenger in Mr. 







Yes, I was. 
Actually it's your car isn't it? 
It is my car# yes. 
Is this your car? 
The one on the left. 
That being the gold Trans Am with the black bra and the 
Trans Am logo on the hood. 
JUDGE: What number is the exhibit? 
ATD: Four. 
JUDGE: You offering this? 
ATD: Yes. 
JUDGE: Any objection. 
ATP: No. 
JUDGE: Exhibit four will be received. 
ATD: And on that evening you were wearing this shirt? Will you 
describe this shirt for the record please. 
A: Pink t-shirt. 
Q: Does it have any writing on it? 








Kind of tattered? 
Ya, I'd say so. It has a few stains and spots on it. 
And this is your t-shirt? 
That is mine. 
And how do you know you were wearing it on June 26? 
Well, I'm pretty sure I was wearing it. I usually know what 








No, your honor. 
Is this number two? 
Yes, I think it is number two, no, it's three. And over 
that shirt what were you wearing? 
A: A leather jacket. 
Q: Would it be this black leather jacket? 
A: That's the jacket. 
Q: Would you describe this jacket for the record please. 
A: It's an open road leather jacket, lots of zippers and 
Q: Is it completely black? 
A: Yes. 
Q: I'd like to submit this to the record. 
JUDGE: Again, it's exhibit number? 
ATD: Exhibit number two. 
JUDGE: Is exhibit two the jacket you were wearing? Is this the one 
that's marked exhibit two? 
WITNESS: Yes, that is. 
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ATD: And you were wearing that jacket on the evening and did you 
have that jacket zipped up? 
A: No, I didn't. 
JUDGE: That will be received by the way the exhibit. And offered 
no objections', is that correct? 
ATP: No objection, your honor. 
ATD: And wearing that jacket zipped up? You weren't wearing it 
zipped up? How much of your pink shirt would you say was showing? 
A: As far as what? I would say 
Q: In the car how much of it was? 
A: Probably four inches, five, six. 
Q: Okay. 
JUDGE: Pointing to the for the record to the chest area about what 
six seven inches below the chin? 
A: Ya, probably about a foot or so. The thing is sittin in the 
car it's pretty low. 
JUDGE: That's fine. The questions been answered. 
ATD: Had you been drinking on that evening? 
A: Yes, I had. 
Q: How much? 
A: I'd say in about a nine hour period I had probably a twelve 
pack or so. 
Q: That's all, thank you. 
CROSS - EXAMINATION 
ATP: Do you own the black jacket? 
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A: Yes, I do. 
Q: Did you bring it to the building today? 
A: Did I bring it to the building today? Yes, I did. 
Q: It wasn't brought in by the defendant? 
A: Urn, as in Brian Case? 
Q: As in Mr. Case. 
A: No, it wasn't brought by him. 
Q: You carried it up and you brought it up in the elevator? 
A: I did. 
Q: Did Mr. Case at anytime have this jacket today? 
A: No, he didn't. 
Q: Does he have a similar jacket? 
A: No, he doesn't. 
Q: Did Mr. Case's girlfriend I think you referred to as? 
A: Ya. 
Q: Did she bring the jacket up? 
A: I just handed to her outside the door. 
Q: When did that occur? 
A: About five minutes ago. 
Q: After they came up in the elevator? 
A: Uh, no just before we came in the courtroom. I was sitting 
outside with it. 
Q: So Mr. Case didn't come up in the elevator with the black 
leather jacket to the best of your knowledge? 
A: No, he didn't. 
Q: And the pink shirt that's with that jacket was it with the 
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jacket all the time? 
JUDGE: You mean this morning? 
ATP: Ya, this morning. 
A: Yes, it was. 
Q: How was it that you recall so specifically that you were 
wearing that shirt on the the 26th? When were you first asked to 
recall what you were wearing that night? 
A: As in today or? 
Q: When were you first asked, did defense counsel ask you what 
you were wearing that night? 
A: Yes, I did. 
Q: When did that occur? 
A: Three or four days ago. 
Q: Three or four days ago, that would make it about September 













How many t-shirts do you own? 
Ten, twenty. 
Does this one have any particular sentimental value? 
Ya, it does. 
And what would that be? 
Actually, it goes good with black. 
Do you have other t-shirts that don't go good with black? 
Ya, I have a few. 
I don't have any further questions, your honor. 
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ATP: Just a minute, your honor, I need to check some dates. 
REDIRECT EXAMINATION 
ATP: Rich, we're going to have to reconstruct. Do you remember 
coming in with Mr. Case to my office shortly after he was arraigned? 
It would have been the 1st of September, the Monday after. Have you 
been to my office twice? 
A: Yes, I have. 
Q: And do you remember on that first meeting towards the first 
of September at that time I asked you some questions about the 
incident? 
A: You never did ask me anything the first time I was there. 
Q: I just couldn't remember what happened at that meeting. 
When did you purchase this jacket? 
A: I'd say it was September of last year. 
Q: And has it been your jacket this whole time? 
A: The whole time. 
Q: What size is that jacket? 
A: Extra large. 
Q: Thank you. 
ATP: One follow-up. June 26, do you recall how warm it was 
outside? 
A: Ya, I do. 
Q: How warm was it? 
A: Probably 80 . 
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Q: 8 0 and you have this, is this leather jacket lined? 
A: Yes, it is. 
Q: And you had it on? 
A: Yes, I did. 
Q: In the car? 
A: Yes, I did. 
Q: No further questions. 
JUDGE: Alright, you can sit down, sir. Any other witnesses for the 
defense? 
ATD: No, the defense rests. 
JUDGE: Alright, the City had the burden of going forward the 
defense then has the burden of raising some issue as to whether or 
not there was not to indicate that there was not an articulable 
reasonable suspicion to stop and I think it the City's burden again 
to convince the court by purponderence of the evidence that there was 
a reasonable suspicion. 
ATP: We do have a rebuttle witness, Officer Bradford. 
JUDGE: Alright. 
ATP: Officer, could you state your name and your occupation for 
the record, please. 
A: Denise Bradfield. I'm a police officer at the University of 
Utah. 
Q: And with the University of Utah, is that correct? 
A: Yes. 
Q: Were you working on June 26 of this year? 
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A: Yes. 
Q: Approximately 2:45 in the morning of that June 26 did you 
respond to the 100 Court of the University Building? 
A: Yes, I did. 
Q: Did you assist Officer LaFavre in the stop of a gold Trans 
Am? 
A: I assisted after he had stopped the vehicle? 
Q: You did witness the defendant and the other passenger in the 
car? 
A: Yes. 
Q: Had you heard the dispatch that sent Officer, you heard 
Officer LaFavre testify as to the dispatch that sent him to the 100 
Court, had you responded on the same dispatch? 
A: Yes, I did. 
Q: And did you observe the passenger in the gold Trans Am? 
A: At the scene of his stop, yes. 
Q: And did he appear to fit the description that had been 
dispatched? 
A: To my opinion he did appear to fit the description. 
Q: Do you recall, was the passenger is the passenger in the 
courtroom? 
A: Yes, he is. 
Q: Is he the gentleman that just testified? 
A: Yes. 
Q: Do you recall was he wearing his black leather jacket on 
that night? 
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A: I do not recall him wearing a jacket at all. 
Q: Do you recall him in a t-shirt? 
A: Yes. 
Q: I have no further questions. 
JUDGE: Cross examination. 
CROSS-EXAMINATION 
Q: Officer Garfield when did you arrive at the scene? 
A: I arrived at the scene shortly before Officer LaFavre, I was 
checking out an individual on foot before he made the stop. 
Q: And when did you arrive at the stop? How long, and maybe 
you don't know this just tell me if you don't, but how long had this 
officer stopped the car before you arrived? 
A: I wouldn't be able to give you a time, but it was a short 
period of time before I went. 
Q: Thank you. 
RE-DIRECT 
Q: Were you present when the passenger and the defendant were 
being questioned about what they were doing in the parking lot? 
A: Yes. 
Q: Did they at any time discuss the fact that they had been in 
that vicinity? 
A: Yes, they did. 
Q: And they had been out of their car or they'd been in their, 
did they appear to be the people you were looking for? 
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A: Yes, they did. 
Q: And you determined that there had been no damage done and 
that' s why they were released? 
A: Yes. 
Q: No further questions. 
ATD: Therefore you determined that there was no vehicle burglary 
or no car prowl at the scene. 
A: It was determined that the individual that we were looking 
for was the passenger and that they had a valid reason for being in 
that area. 
Q: In what area? 
A: The area of the West Village. 
Q: Did you ask him if he had been in the 100 Court area? 
A: Yes, we asked. I did not ask but I was present when they 
were asking, yes, when Officer LaFavre was asking him. 
Q: That will be all, thank you. 
JUDGE: Anything further from the State? 
ATD: Your honor, I want to call two rebuttle witnesses. 
JUDGE: What's the subject of the sir rebuttle? 
ATD: As to whether they were in the 100 Court area. Rich does 
not remember which court it was. I believe that if I question him 
he'll say that he was not in the 100 Court area once he understands 
the layout and I think Brenda can set-up the layout for us. I'd, my 
client can tell us, I don't want to put him on the stand. 
ATP: And I would simply argue that's not relevant really. They 
determined based on what they investigated that he was not the 
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individual. Whether it's the 100 Court or the 500 Court isn't really 
what's relevant. What's relevant is that they determined he was not 
the individual or that he was the person they were looking for based 
on his descriptions of where he'd been. They determined there was no 
car prowl. This is a reasonable stop motion. He's the person they 
wanted to talk to and they stopped him for that purpose. We're kind 
of getting lost in this. 
JUDGE: That's your position 
ATD: I believe Mr. Zollinger opened the door. 
JUDGE: I'm sorry. 
ATD: I believe Mr. Zollinger opened the door by asking what 
happened after the stop by trying to put in facts that my that these 
were the people they were looking for. My position is is that Rich 
is not the person they were looking for and Officer Garfield that 
they determined that he was in the area. The area was 100 Court. My 
information is that they weren't on 100 Court. 
ATP: And again, my position would be her testimony was that her 
subjective opinion was these were the people they'd been looking for. 
Subjectiveness is what is necessary to be shown here on the part of 
the officer for the reasonable suspicion to stop. 
JUDGE: But well how reasonable it is might depend. Supposing the 
dispatch gave a location. The suspect was found far away from that 
location. That certainly goes to the reason . 
ATP: And it would if we were talking about far away. We're 
talking about an exit from several courts. 
JUDGE: But I think that's probably, she has a right to present that 
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evidence that's relevant. Why don't we do it this way though 
counsel. I think you can call your client without subjecting him to 
any other cross-examination except for the one subject you're going 
to explore. Do you want to do it that way? 
ATD: That would be fine if we can I just want it limited. 
JUDGE: Okay, I would limit cross-examination only to the general 
area that you deal with on direct-examination. 
ATD: James on the 26th 
JUDGE: Pardon me, for the record could we establish who the witness 
is. 
CROSS - EXAMINATION 
ATD: I'm sorry. Would you state your name for the record. 
A: James E. Case. 
Q: And what is your address? 
A: 124 T Street. 
Q: On the 26th you were at the University Village. 
JUDGE: And that's the month of June? 
ATD: June 26th. You were at the University Village and what were 
you doing there? 
A: Dropping off my girlfriend. 
Q: And what court does your girlfriend live in? 
A: 800. 
Q: And at any time did you enter the 100 court? 
A: Well you have to drive by 100 to go to 800 and back out past 
it to get back out. 
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Q: Did you or Rich get out of the car in the 100 court? 
A: Just me. No, not in 100 in 800. 
Q: In 800 you got out of the car and where'd you walk? 
A: Just her to her door and back to the car and then leaving. 
Q: And Rich never got out of the car? 
A: No. 
Q: That's all. 
JUDGE: Cross. 
ATP: No, thank you. 
JUDGE: Nothing, you can have a seat. 
ATD: That will be everything for the defense. 
JUDGE: Alright, it's your motion so I'll give you that first 
opportunity. 
JUDGE: Let me ask you this before you start. The critical issue is 
obviously and I'll be willing to find at this point, Mr. Farnworth 
who was the passenger who may or may not have been the subject of the 
dispatch is male with all due respect it's fair to describe him and I 
would as chunky. He has medium brown hair I wouldn't say that 
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it's dark brown hair. He's clearly not Hispanic. I'd be willing to 
find based on his testimony nothing to controvert it that he was 
wearing a pink t-shirt not a white t-shirt on the evening in 
question. That he was wearing a jacket that was zippered in the 
front which would expose some of the front of the t-shirt, but that 
he was covering the shirt with the jacket. So based on those finding 
I think that the evidence preponderates that way. I guess the legal 
question is and I'll also I further find that even though Mr. Case 
and Mr. Famworth had not stopped in the 100 Court even Mr. Case's 
testimony was that they had to drive by 100 Court to get in and out 
of the 800 Court area on their errand. So I suppose the question is 
how close does the description have to meet. I think you would 
stipulate wouldn't you counsel that if in fact Mr. Famworth had been 
Hispanic if he had been wearing a white t-shirt that if he were this 
close to the 100 Court block then there would be reasonable 
suspicion, is that correct? 
ATD: No, your honor, I wouldn't stipulate to that because I 
believe they needed the dispatch tape here. I believe the dispatch 
tape has to be there has to be we need to know who this informant 
was. Was this an anonymous tip or is it a citizen's call. They 
allow her to, just a minute I have to get my bearings, 
JUDGE: Sure. 
ATD: If you look at there's a lot of case law around this state 
and we need to determine is this an inherently reliable tip. We 
can't have citizen's using other people in this way and maybe they 
wouldn't, but I think if you look at People v. Garcia, where an 
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anonymous tip calls and said so and so was leaving at 1:30 their 
I. f own Lars paikeil out in I he Link eiml 1 More' II b<- 1 ^  ouno* \\\ 
cocaine under the hooc 1though the court ruled there was 
reasonable suspicion ther- I think that's it's fraught with the 
possi se e a ,1 J. ki nds of i:1 ome s 1.1 c ma 1.1e r s 
where people do set-ups . ,.nk that the dispatch office needs to 
. and determine who this person calling was. 
There < -idence that this is a citizen's call I think :i f 
. % State v. Roth, that just came down from the Court of 
# I I ley in Mi there Wrr, reasonable si ispi ci on 
because they knew and they specifically stated that it was the 
Un.versitv Hospital Security Poli - 'herefore, 1: had • 
re i . . . - i_ ,. - -±y gs u e a 
d e s c r i p t i o n ef t ; •": i n d i v j a u a - r *"•- * * • : : - a r che l i c e n s e 
p i ' • e r o i cue cdr, unts a n " " on I C wou - .ing The 
o f f i c e r d:r ove up and fount* i*- ^i^ no ro T » ^ t(, ^ e r e h a s t o 
be someth ing fur ther s u b s t a n t i a t i n g t h i s - - ? t a l : r * f the 
c i rcums t ance s t he 
dispatch officer has L. re information nvie knowledge. 
Cases that bear this out are Olsen v. The Commission of Public 
Safety,, whi ::h i s a Ml nnesota case, 3""1 n w 2d 55/' and there it sa1, ™. 
while their dispatch was in possession or specific and articulable 
facts supporting reasonable suspicion, is essential. In that case it 
was a DUI. In this case was ar e the ar ti culable facts that a car 
prowl occurred? All we know is that there was someone out in the 10 0 
Court I don't believe .that that's reasonabl e si ispicion We 
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could have anytime we see someone on the street we could call the 
police and the police would haves to come out. Maybe the dispatch 
office knew that, but the City has not presented or bore their burden 
on that. In Citv of Wake Forest v. Dugan, again, they said it's the 
burden of the facts the burden lies on the officer, the facts 
available to the officer. You heard him testify all he knew is a 
chunky individual, Hispanic looking, with a white t-shirt. Well, 
maybe if we mix the two my client and Rich you might get that 
description but separately we have a chunky individual wearing a pink 
t-shirt and to my eye he doesn't look Hispanic to me. I have other 
cases if the court wants them, but the continuing theme is we have 
specific cars, specific colors, specific suspect identification and 
drivers licenses and most of these are DUI cases, and a driving 
pattern or something more. Absent the driving pattern or criminal 
behavior. The courts have overturned it said, we must suppress. 
ATP: All of the cases she has cited to, your honor, refer to 
stopping the individual that they intended to stop, subsequently 
arresting him on the charge that the call was made on. In this case 
we're not anywhere near that. They stopped on an investigative stop 
based on a reasonable call from an individual stating someone is out 
in my parking lot. If she expects that the court should require 
citizen's screenings to be dealt with in the same fashion that a 
prosecutor deals with screenings. She's missed the mark. There's no 
court case out there that says that. The dispatcher has a duty to 
determine the inherent reliability, the reliability of the call to 
the best of their ability. Over the telephone that's very 
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simple. Somebody is committing a crime, could you investigate it? 
-;. • - •- - v ':* - f* - --' ' on 
that investigate --: su.. -hey determined that : M I . .;:,..*: L M C was 
proximit^ * person they wante* > quest; : -a- ;- fact 
1 1 ii 
respect. They had from ?r:::er.- testimony . M . - who 
i x u ^n their opinions the descriptions that had been dispatched. The 
officers had subjective 
SIDE B cent. 
-^  ~ iculable facts which caused the stop In this case they had a 
- .. .. • • wh i tie 1: sh :i i !:: The :our t i nd icated the re 
/idence that h. -,Mn't wearing a jacket. I would proffer to 
die court Officer LaFavre did indicate that the individual was in a 
t-shirt onl^ th*i- there was no jacket involved I would also 
indicate that the defendant's appearance at 3:00 o'clock in the 
what the court has to look at not what we here in the light of day 
can see, but what they a car passing by them leaving the area, that 
they' re going to i nvestigate wou] d perceive , 11;„"' i t" he i r percepticn 
and it is their perception that of a reasonable officer. We have two 
officers here both testifying r-* - ;:e sarv--: thing, That's the standard 
t-. , t . formed here reasonable ai id 
would another officer under the similar circumstances. That's what 
the Utah State law is. 
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Would another officer under similar circumstances have responded in a 
like fashion. I don't think there's any evidence at all before this 
court to indicate otherwise. They both testified to the light 
colored t-shirt, they both believe it was a white t-shirt. And given 
that that is the state of the law right now in Utah I don't believe 
the court has any choice but to find there was reasonable suspicion 
for the stop. 
ATD: Your honor, Mr. Zollinger is asking you to give more 
credibility to the officers. In every jury trial we ask can you 
equally weigh the evidence. I don't believe the officers' testimony 
is any more credible than Mr. than Rich's. Rich, there's no evidence 
that he lies. There's nothing to doubt his credibility. Further, I 
think Roth our most recent Court of Appeals decision discusses the 
reliability of the informant. It goes into discussing why in Roth 
the informant was reliable. We don't know anything about this 
informant. The Oregon Supreme Court stated: 
We hold that an anonymous tip in this case has to have some 
inditia of reliability in order for it to give rise to 
reasonable suspicion. 
I sense the overtones of Mr. Zollinger's argument is that this 
something less than reasonable suspicion we need. It's not. It has 
to be reasonable suspicion and I just don't think its here. Even 
based on the facts if you want to skip the dispatch argument Rich 
does not look Hispanic, he was wearing a pink t-shirt and he was 
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wearing a black leather jacket. He's not prepped in the 1 aw. 
There's mo reasor ' - .- **r:f./ 
suspicion argument *. :. .;:- ^c ; «*- -.-. ' argumer a 
dispatch and If ) :* wa r^ ^^r-- -vd* •• -r~.::- ."?. memoranda 'TI 
th is as requested noweve; - .-. --. . 
than put th i s off r v •..-•- *'ould be glac 
1 che c u u r i un Hie i S s u e u l whether Lfle r e l i a b x x l t y u i 
t informant You don't have a dispatch tape here. He said a 
c i t i zen called and said there 's a person in my yard or in my courtho, 
c ; • hear that :i n idence at ai I. 
That ' s : : . . 
JUDGE seems '" o me : • -- issues, we probably need to 
1 - HI 
caller inherently anyway The reasonable inference > someone 
complained about a car prowler and the officers were called uo 
investigate and I guess the first issue is seems to me your question 
before the officers can stop anybody in response to a c3 ispatch call 
t E: i n £ o rma t i on And I gii e s s t he 
question is how much information do they have to have. If someone 
calls and reports a car prowl or a car burglary which is what a car 
prowl u.., before !; he officer • ::a n J an) body I g i less they tuve t o 
have a certain amount of information. What is that? A quantum,, of 
information you have to have that seems to me to be the first issue 
and then the second issue i s befoi e a stop can be reasonable how 
closely to the description much the subject of the stop fit? 
Obviously officers can't, go out when they're given a descript i on of 
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the suspect and stop just anybody. If the stop isn't reasonable I 
would think both sides would agree to that. Even in their own minds 
they have some subjective reason for thinking gee maybe this person's 
it even though he a lot different or she's a lot different from the 
person that was described, the stop wouldn't be reasonable. There 
has to be some objective standard to look at in saying no this was 
the description given, this is the description of the subject of the 
stop, how closely do they have to match? And I'm not familiar with 
any case that talks about that. That would seem to me to be the 
focus of your research and I'd ask you if you would counsel to 
prepare something and have it ready by let's see, the trial is set 
for October the 14th so I'll ask you to be ready with something let's 
say October the 5th and then Mr. Zollinger you can respond by the 
13th. We won't have time to have a reply memorandum submitted. But 
to focus on those two issues, and as I said the second one is my main 
concern because this isn't really a tip this isn't someone calling 
the police and saying hey look if you stop Mr. so and so you're going 
to find some drugs. This is an actual call a complaint and it has 
more of an emergency overtone and it would seem to me the police need 
a lot less information before they can investigate that than they 
would just that kind of a tip that it maybe your cases Ms. Kreeck 
Mendez that you've referred to would deal with. But if you want to 
look at that issue too. 
ATD: Alright.d 
JUDGE: So the deadlines are October the 5th and October the 13 for 
a reply and then I'll give you my ruling sometime prior to the trial 
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and I suppose it may be dispositive depending on how 1 go. 
SALT LAKE CITY i; JAMES CASE 
TAPE NO. 2235 
CASE NO. 925018713TC 
JUDGE REESE 
ATD: DEBORAH KREECK MENDEZ 
ATP: STEVEN ZOLLINGER 
JUDGE: - record Mr. Case is present with counsel the City and 
State is -* v1 qoiu» Ihi'oixfh bni h Che memorar 
support c: motion suppress and the response to the memorandum 
and prepared ; unless there :. --something else from the two 
< now w'idi iiii I 
i n d i c a t e d e a r l i e r . Anything e l se? 
ATP: No. 
J [JDGEi I 'm going to denv t-he motion t<~> suppress anc *ak» t->^ee 
s p e c i f i c f a c t u a l f ind ings Number r m o r a t the Un ive r s i ty 
lit: ah po 1 1 ce o f £ i ce r Le f . . . 
which means vehicle burglar, m* ^ uiu..,i parking are. .r, * - .- , . *. c j^ t 
area of the University Village sometime after midnight whe : %- w. 
still dark , That: the dispatcher gave Of £ i cei LeFev re a descr ipt on 
of the suspect a nd that description was of a chunky male, possibly 
Hispanic, who was wearing a white t-shirt The dispatcher di d not 
give Officei LeE ev r e ox the other . -. iy other details , The 
officer did not know who had phoned ,\ - - complaint to dispatch. 
When approaching University Village the officer saw a car with a 
passenger who I n the officer's judgment appeared to match the 
description of the dispatch,, He thought that the passenger was 
chunky and Hispanic and was wearing a white 1: - shirt. The car that 
- 2 8 • 
the officer saw was not in the 100 court area, it was in the 
proximity of the University Village, in fact, was coming out on the 
Sunnyside Blvd. or street from University Village which was within 
just a few blocks of University Village at the time the officer first 
observed the car and the passenger. The officer stopped the car, 
approached the passenger who had given rise to the officer's 
suspicion was a man by the name of Richard Farnsworth and Mr. 
Farnsworth the court would find was at the time the officer made the 
stop and is currently or is at least the time of the hearing number 
1) a male; 2) in the court's judgment would fit the description of 
chunky, was about 5'6" according to his description 184 lbs., has 
brown hair which is moderate to dark, not light brown hair not 
necessarily black hair or deep black hair, but certainly moderate. 
That Mr. Farnsworth is not Hispanic but does have a moderate 
complexion, again, not particularly dark or particularly light. The 
court would find that at the time of the stop Mr. Farnsworth was 
wearing a pink light colored t-shirt which was covered by a dark 
leather jacket, the jacket was partially zipped that even though Mr. 
Farnsworth was seated in the vehicle the potion of the t-shirt, the 
upper part of the t-shirt would have been visible for the officer to 
make the stop. The officer then who had stopped Mr. Farnsworth the 
car that Farnsworth was riding in the court would find thought he was 
stopping the subject of the dispatch. To my mind that's critical. 
In other words, he did not use the dispatch as a pretext tc 
stop the vehicle or he wasn't acting on some hunch. He thought that 
the vehicle he was topping contained the subject of the dispatch 
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based on the description that the officer had been given. The driver 
of the car that Farnsworth was riding on is Mr, Case was arrested 
subsequently for Driving Under the Influence of Alcohol after other 
p " i d e n c* rj w t I 1 i • I" i w .is :i n p J a, :i :i:i v' i e w r.i n < i p 1 a 11* 1 s ni e J I t: 1:1 1: In e I:,I f f• 1 c e r • ^  a v e 
rise to additional suspicions which the officers then acted upon. 
Based on the testimony the court would find that the defendant Mr. 
Case and Mi Fai : luwort li A/I'N1 »-JI I ]IH I In i vet. ,1,1 ly Village on legitimate 
business. They were not burglarizing any vehicles there They were 
xu che ouu courc area 01 uuc University village jjut did drive near 
the* inn nov^t area when the were exiting ^ on Mr Farnsworth's 
testimony the court would find that actually leave \:. 
••*. se-:. .c .»- thar. were rained by the motion to suppress: I 
:.-. i the dispatc1' : "isel f provide reasonable suspicion upon which an 
*-:":...- ' ' '• * --er based on the 
information of dispatch arrest someone who matched the description. 
I would find that it did and they could. It was limited informati on 
but it di d report two critical things. 1 ) the crime, the car prow 1 
and the location of the ca r prowl and 2) provided information 
regarding the suspect. It was not very < v -
to me it would be poor policy to require .- w . c r w. demand more 
information. At night like that people see ,. .1 -ue be;:;:; committed 
t hey often ha ve v iaT"ir 1 *» ttl e i n for™*1" J on • -". ^ * *-- 1 
to the police and ..;- police should ce entitled ;n :nr society : .' 
and make an investigatory stop for a brief perioc r see i.i the 
sub j ect o f the s t: • Dp who i s the person w! 1 : was committing the crime. 
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So I would find at least that the officer did have enough information 
from the dispatch to act upon. He had reasonable suspicion based on 
the dispatch- The second question the big one I guess that was 
really brought forward by the motion to suppress was did the officer 
have reasonable suspicion to stop the defendant's vehicle? In other 
words, did he have sufficient objective articulable facts that the 
passenger in the car was involved in criminal activity? The officer 
didn't know anything about the DUI at the time, he was stopping the 
car because he thought the passenger may have been involved in a car 
prowl. And again I would find that the officer did and the officer 
was responding to a legitimate complaint again not acting on some 
hunch or pretext. Mr. Farnsworth was in the dark and at a distance 
could have looked Hispanic with his dark hair and mustache. He was 
of a chunky build, he did have on a light colored I'll be it pink 
t-shirt opposed to a white t-shirt which was visible to the officer 
when Mr. Farnsworth was seated in the vehicle. Mr. Farnsworth was 
also in an area which was near the reported crime. It was the 
vehicle again was exiting University Village which is a short 
distance from 100 court area. Based on this I would find that it was 
not unreasonable for the police officer to stop the vehicle briefly 
to investigate. Therefore, I would find that the officer did have a 
reasonable and articulable suspicion to stop the vehicle and 
investigate. The investigation was brief. That it was additional 
facts after the stop that gave rise to the charge against Mr. Case 
and that those facts were within the plain view and smell of the 
officer after he had legitimately stopped the car. So based on all 
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it rhar Mr Case I'm going tn deny your attorney's mofion to suppress 
I. Iif-1 e w i d e x i L i - 1 !.Ill il wd„ . h u L i n . l mi ', m i i M i ' i I In i" in i w i . . . t u p p e d 
the officer's viewing of your passenger i i where does that 
leave us. 
ATD: Y ouz honor, can I have a week? 
JUDGE: You want us to set it for trial again 
ADDENDUM B 
State v. James B. Case 
CASE NO. 925018713 
JUDGE ROBIN W. REESE 
ATD: DEBORAH KREECK MENDEZ 
ATP: STEVEN ZOLLINGER 
HEARING: 11/9/92 
TAPE NO 223 5 
1 JUDGE1: • "t Lake City v. James B. Case, actually it's State of 
2 ..^  - --
 u s e lL & d university of Utah Police case? 
3 A T D j yes, I^ L. - ^ 
4 .JUDGE; If T remember correct! .ie record, Mr. Case is 
5 present t . s 
6 t h r o u g h be*.-; t , - •::emcrandum i;,y i . - ci::r. .-..•-...•press 
•y - ^ ^ ^j^g r 6 s r r n t r c i * *->•**- rrifarnpr*ariHii|TTi zzr^r* r^reoared *" ~ r* -' & u n l e s s 
8 t h e r e ' s sc . . . . .. s 
9 i -r my ruli'i'j :«c ^hich 1 ve indicated edirlit-.: Anything else? 
10 
11 J, T,vn qci^n to deny the motion to suppress and ™ 1 make 
12 - -» specific ractual findings Number one, the 
13 0ff i c ei: I .ePei ore \ : i 
14 suspected car pr'. v. wii.c > xeans vehicle burglary „r: common - at 
15 C^urt area of the University Villa*.:- o^-^*^- after 
1 6 . — , * Eii'i :!i t s y ra s s t i 1 1 da :i : I :: I I: n <= /!::::: t h B d i s u - ,.T , - . .- : 
17 LeFevre a description of the suspect and that descripnicr wa?- of a 
18 chunky male possibl y hi spanic, who wa s wearing a wh i te t-shi rt, 
19 The dispatcher" d i I not gi ve Officer LeFev re or the other officer s 
20 any other details. The officer did not know who had phoned in the 
22 officer saw a car with a "passenger « '. ,. the officer's judgment, 
23 appeared to match the description of Lhe dispatch. He thought that 
1 the passenger was chunky and hispanic and was wearing a white t-
2 shirt. The car that the officer saw was not in the 100 Court area 
3 but was in the proximity of the University Village; in fact, it was 
4 coming out on the Sunnyside Boulevard or Street from the University 
5 Village within just a few blocks of University Village at the time 
6 the officer first observed the car and the passenger. The officer 
7 stopped the car and approached. The passenger, who had given 
8 rights to the officer's suspicion, was a man by the name of 
9 Richard Famsworth and Mr. Farnsworth, the Court would find, was, 
10 at the time the officer made the stop and is currently, or at least 
11 at the time of the hearing, number one, a male. Number two, in the 
12 Court's judgment, would fit the description of chunky--was about 
13 five-six according to his description, 184 pounds, has brown hair 
14 which is moderate to dark, not light brown hair, not necessarily 
15 black hair or deep black hair but certainly moderate, but 
16 Mr. Farnsworth is not hispanic but does have a moderate complexion, 
17 again, not particularly dark or particularly light. The Court 
18 would find at the time of the stop Mr. Farnsworth was wearing a 
19 pink, light colored t-shirt which was covered by a dark leather 
20 jacket. The jacket was partially zipped. That even though 
21 Mr. Farnsworth was seated at the vehicle, that the portion of the 
22 t-shirt, the upper part of the t-shirt would have been visible to 
23 the officer who made the stop. The officer then stopped the, who 
24 had stopped Mr. Farnsworth, the car that Farnsworth was riding in, 
25 the Court would find, thought he was stopping the subject of a 
26 dispatch. To my mind that's critical. In other words, he did not 
2 
1 u s e t h e d i s p a t c h as a p r e t e x t o r ??"} to s t o p t h e v e h i c l e . He 
2 w a s n ' t i r l " I mi ni l nnmn h n n r h lln r h m i q h f Hint" tho w h i r I f hi r \ i/as 
3 s t o p p i n g c o n t a i n e d t h e s u b j e c t o i n d i s p a t c h , ba sed on t h e 
4 d e s c r i p t i o n t h a t t h e o f f i c e r had been qivi in, I lie d r i v e r of t h e c a r 
5 D i a l FarnswoT i l '•> i iriiny mi m Mi (\,u:^1, was a r r e s t e d 
6 s u b s e q u e n t l y f o r i n v i n g u n d e r the i n f l u e n c e of a l c o h o l a f t e r o t h e r 
7 e v i d e n c e , which '<nm in p l . n n ^new iirnl p l a i n smell t o t h e o f f i c e r , 
8 g a v e r i s e fo a d d i t i o n a l s u s p i c i o n s WII.IL li Hit; o t t i c e r . s then a c t e d 
9 u p o n , Based on t h e t e s t i m o n y , t h e i n nil wumlld f ind I In. ill I. he 
10 d e f e n d a n t " INIi <i i i i i in l IMIi Pai nswni t i i W H I P nit l l n U I I I V H I 1 if f 
1 ,1 V i l l a g e mi l e g i t i m a t e b u s i n e s s , I I in , in IM in ill I m in q i a n z i n g any 
12 v e h i c l e s , They were in t.lin Hill) Court a r e a of t h e U n i v e r s i t y 
II i. V i I l a y * - , . I  m l i II i I i I  i M i i n «11 I lln II n i l i mi i I 11 i i n l n m I  I n 1 , n n i e 
14 . e x i t i n q B.ised on Mr. F a r n s w o r t h ' s t e s t i m o n y , t h e Cour t would f i n d 
15 t h a t he d i d n o t a c t u a l l y l e a v e t h e c a i wlixle a t t h e U n i v e r s i t y 
L i j arrt* The re a r e twn r _ .
 : i s s u e s t h a ^ seem t o me w..~~ 
17 were r a i s e s . ac t ion ne 
I JI 
19 o f i x c e i * w- . a, + .* :* wu. .^» , ,, an j f f i c e i , based on t n e 
20 i n f o r m a t i o n of t ne d i s p a t c h e r --.-* some *\^  matched :-he 
i I 
22 * i= l i m i t e d mfoxma txc wd* ^uDtnii; eJ . \ . , r e p o r t : ^ > 
21 c r i t i c a " t * • • number cn*=- r i ^ *• h<~ - - r prowl and t h e 
., i 
25 regarding tne <^-^  > . v . c .* . detailea ,.: •* AVU!,: seem 
2 6 co me cnac n wouid be poor policy Lu xequixe LUC police to demand 
1 more information. A night like that, people see a crime being 
2 committed they often have very little information. They report 
3 what they have to the police and the police should be entitled in 
4 our society to act and make an investigatory stop for a brief 
5 period to ses if the subject of the stop was the person who was 
6 committing the crime. So, I would find or hold at least that the 
7 officer did have enough information from the dispatch to act upon. 
8 He had reasonable suspicion based on the dispatch. The second 
9 question, the big one I guess, that was really brought forward by 
10 the motion to suppress was did the officer have reasonable 
11 suspicion to stop the defendant's vehicle. In other words, did he 
12 have a sufficient, objective, articuable facts that the passenger 
13 in the car was involved in criminal activity. The officer didn't 
14 know anything about the DUI at the time. He was stopping the car 
15 because he thought the passenger may have been involved in a car 
16 prowl and again I would find that the officer did. The officer was 
17 responding to a legitimate complaint again, not acting on some 
18 hunch or pretext. Mr. Farnsworth was in the dark and at a distance 
19 could have looked hispanic with his dark hair and moustache. He 
20 was of a chunky build. He did have on a light-colored, all-be-it 
21 pink, t-shirt as opposed to a white t-shirt which was visible to 
22 the officer when Mr. Farnsworth was seated in the vehicle. 
23 Mr. Farnsworth was also in an area which was near the reported 
24 crime. It was, the vehicle again was exiting University Village 
25 which is a short distance from 100 Court area. Based on this, I 
26 would find that it was not unreasonable for the police officer to 
4 
1 stop the vehicle briefly to :! nvestigate I herefore- * •*•—'-: -*ind 
2 t l l a t t:::]l: u = o f fi c e r ::i :i d h a v e a i : • Esasoi lai: i] e ai: 1 ::i ai I::i c i lat -^  . ... _D 
3 stop the vehicle and investigate . ri is ::i investigation was brief . 
4 That it was additional facts after the stop that gave ri se t, :: • the 
5 charge against M:i : Case and that those facts wer e within the plain 
6 view and smell of the officer after he had legitimately stopped the 
8 attorney's motion to suppress the ev idence that was found on you 
9 after the car was stopped based on the officer's viewing of your 
10 passenger So, ::  ox u ise] h,€ :i : s ::ic = 3 t h = .t J 2a i • = \ is? 
ATD: Your Honor can i rjve .. < 
x w u WCLI L^J d e l JLL l u i . u i i a i dyct-Liir 
Tust s e t mr t r i a l T n^^H t-o make some ??? 
- ., JUDGE . w e ' r e net ^o ing r t r y i t today we, we can be 
AI,. , .+ . flf.r v...* , -? t r i a l a t t h i s t ime so i f you 
w a - t rn y::r — — -* T^. r^ady f u l l dav J 'just need t ime t o d e c i d e 
i i "I; I i mIJIy „ Exac t ] y w h a t 
you n e e a e d . 
ATD: T h a t ' s f i n e 
il O'PCK . "Ill I I lie dcite We ' I, I ,see yun back h e r e , 
ATD; Thank you, 'i ou r Honor, 
& o JUDGE: You b e t . 
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and correct transcription of the hearing held. 
DATED at Salt Lake City, Utah this^ ra day of January, 1994 9/ 
fiJYX&^Ub-^ 
ANDREA CEDERLOF 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
DELIVERED a copy of the foregoing trial transcript to the 
City Prosecutor's Office, 451 South Second East, Salt Lake City, Utah 
84111 this day of January, 1994. 
L' K k "T 1 L" L U A 1' E 
1 SHEIV.I HAM.1 II 'IIII am employed - a s e c r e t a r y by t h e Sal t . Lake 
L«Kjdl hefe t ider Assoc u t IUU. I i n i i s u L i U i 
p r o c e e d i n g s i n t he a b o v e - e n t i t l e d and numbered m a t t e r b e f o r e t h e 
H o n o r a b l e Rob.i.n W Reesp and t"hat t h e f o r e g o i n g i s a t r u e and c o r r e c t 
t i axisei ipL i uii i»I l I ii. tie n JLIHJ he 1 d . 
P?. T^*^ > S i l l *" T l 1 ' 7 A P i f ^ i TTf - i l l II I i i I i11, i j i If II i r | | M r u II Ml Mi I 
ERI HANSEN*' SH
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
... .a copy of the foregoing trial transcript to the 
City Prosecutor's Office, 451 South Second East, Salt Lake City, Utah 
84111 tnis , of January, 1994. 
BEUVEfigB BY 
JAN 2 l'J;.H 
PAT MK-. 
ADDENDUM C 
THIRD ( iii( mi COURT, r;i Air ui in AM 
SALT LA.xL ' r ~ ' f,r"MENT 
UI I- IAH , 
f i n t i f f 
I I ' IES B CASE, 
Defei iclai it. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
Hi 
(JOMi'l 111 I' >M " M I """» 
Case Nn n'i?5018713 
ninHIi w Heese 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Officer f ~c?vre was dispatched 
to a suspected car provvi, ui veinc1" h -*-' 
court of the University Village sometime after midnight. 
2. Kir Uispatchui y,i tv, Ull i - . wing description of the suspect: 
a chui iky male, possibly Hispanic, wearing a white t-shirt. These were HIP r nil » 
de tails provided by the dispatcher. 
3. Fht •• 
4. When approaching the University Village shc..y ^...w, Ui0 dispatch the 
< ^ w a car with a passenger who, in the officer's judgment, appeared *J 
matcri nit: ut 
hisoan'-c, aw* /, a- y^tarr c a light t sr 
,: / Rnrf 
5. At the time the officer first observed the car and the passenger they were 
not in the 100 court area, but could have been driving away from that location. 
6. The officer stopped the car near the entrance to University Village on 
Sunnyside Boulevard. 
7. After the officer stopped the car he approached the passenger, who had 
given rise to the officer's first suspicion. The passenger was a man by the name 
of Richard Farnsworth. 
8. Mr. Farnsworth is: male; fits the description of chunky, approximately 5'6" 
184 lbs.; and has brown hair which is moderate to dark. Farnsworth is not 
hispanic. 
9. At the time of the stop, Mr. Farnsworth was wearing a pink t-shirt which 
was covered by dark leather jacket, the jacket was partially zipped. The upper 
part of the t-shirt would have been visible to the officer, even though Mr. 
Farnsworth was seated. 
10. The officer who stopped Mr. Farnsworth thought he was stopping the 
subject of the earlier dispatch. 
11 . Based on the description that the officer had received, it was reasonable to 
think that the vehicle he was stopping contained the subject of the dispatch. 
12. The driver of the car that Mr. Farnsworth was riding in was Mr. Case. 
13. Mr. Case was arrested subsequently for Driving Under the Influence of 
Alcohol after other evidence which was in plain view and plain smell gave rise to 
additional suspicions which the officer then acted upon. 
14. Mr. Case and Mr. Farnsworth were at the University Village on legitimate 
business. They had not burglarized any vehicles. 
15. Mr. Case and Mr. Farnsworth were originally in the 800 court area of the 
University Village, but did drive near the 100 court area of the University Village 
when exiting the area. 
16. Mr. Farnsworth did not actually get out of the car while at the University 
Village. 
17. The officer's detention of Farnsworth was brief. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The officer did not use the dispatch as a pretext to stop the vehicle. He 
thought that he was stopping the subject of the dispatch. 
2. The officer's stop of the vehicle was based on objective articulable facts 
such that the officer had a reasonable suspicion that the passenger, Farnsworth, 
was involved in criminal activity. The passenger's appearance, and proximity to 
the reported criminal activity, gave rise to that suspicion. 
DATED this *2L3> day of December, 1992. 
Robin W. Reese 
Third Circuit Court Judge 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing 
Findings of Fact & Conclusions of Law, postage prepaid, to Deborah Kreeck 
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Salt Lake City, UT 84111 and Stephen P. Zollinger, Salt Lake City Prosecutor's 
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day of December, 1992. ^-\ 
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SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOCIATION 
424 East 500 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
IN THE THIRD CIRCUIT COURT IN AND OF SALT LAKE COUNTY, 
STATE OF UTAH, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
SALT LAKE CITY, 
Plaintiff, 
V. 
JAMES B. CASE 
Defendant. 
SUPPLEMENTAL FINDINGS OF FACT 
AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Case No. 925018713 
JUDGE ROBIN W. REESE 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
3. The dispatch provided sufficient information on which 
an officer could base reasonable suspicion to arrest 
someone matching the dispatch description. 
Specifically, the dispatch included: 
1) alleged crime a car prowl, 
2) location of the car prowl, 
and 3) information regarding the suspect. 
DATED this I ' day of January, 1993. 
W JL^L 
ROBIN W. REESE 
Third Circuit Court Judge 
ADDENDUM D 
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 
AMENDMENT IV 
[Unreasonable searches and seizures.] 
The right of the people to be secure in their per-
sons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreason-
able searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and 
no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, 
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly 
describing the place to be searched, and the persons 
or things to be seized. 
CONSTITUTION OF UTAH 
Sec. 7. [Due process of law.] 
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or prop-
erty, without due process of law. 1896 
Sec. 14. [Unreasonable searches forbidden — 
Issuance of warrant.] 
The right of the people to be secure in their per-
sons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable 
searches and seizures shall not be violated; and no 
warrant shall issue but upon probable cause sup-
ported by oath or affirmation, particularly describing 
the place to be searched, and the person or thing to be 
seized. 1896 
UTAH CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 
77-7-15. Authority of peace officer to stop and 
question suspect — Grounds. 
A peace officer may stop any person in a public 
place when he has a reasonable suspicion to believe 
he has committed or is in the act of committing or is 
attempting to commit a public ofifense and may de-
mand his name, address and an explanation of his 
actions. 1980 
